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STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Does a trial court abuse discretion when it denies 
appellant's request for continuance if the appellant had a 
knowledge of the witness prior to the date of trial? 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court under Section 
77-35-26(2)(a) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and Section 
78-2a-3(2)(c) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) whereby a 
defendant in a criminal case may take an appeal to the Court 
of Appeals from a final judgment of conviction of a class B 
misdemeanor rendered in a circuit court. In this case, 
defendant was convicted by a jury before the Honorable 
Robert C. Gibson, Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MARK MITCHELL aka MILLER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 870286-CA 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Mark Mitchell 
aka, Miller, for one count of vehicle molestation, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Section 32-3-8, Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City. A jury found Mr. Mitchell 
guilty of vehicle molestation and not guilty of disturbing 
the peace at the end of a one-day trial on May 18, 1987. 
Judge Robert C. Gibson sentenced Mr. Mitchell on June 
22, 1987. The defendant was ordered to serve 180 days in 
jail, with all but 30 days suspended; pay $500.00 in 
attorney's fees; pay $549.00 in restitution; and be on 
probation to Adult Probation and Parole for one year. The 
terms of probation are that the defendant complete a 
substance abuse counseling program, get a full-time job, 
avoid contact with known drug users, and complete forty 
hours of community service. 
FACTS 
The facts, when viewed in a light favorable to 
upholding the jury verdict demonstrate: 
1. The defendant, Mark Mitchell aka Mark Miller, was 
charged with Vehicle Molestation and Disturbing the Peace, 
both class B misdemeanors by information issued December 22, 
1986. (R. 59). 
2. Appellant-Mitchell appeared for arraignment and 
indicated that his true name was Mark Mitchell. He was 
appointed counsel through the Legal Defenders Association. 
His attorney, Lynn Donaldson filed an appearance of counsel 
and request for discovery pursuant to Section 77-35-16 
U.C.A., on February 4, 1987. In response to the discovery 
request the Salt Lake City Prosecutors office delivered a 
formal information and police report to the Legal Defendants 
office. The police report listed the only known witness to 
the offense, the victim Mr. Roosevelt Willburn. (R.R. 1). 
3. No further requests or motions regarding the 
discovery were filed by the defense. A pretrial conference 
was scheduled for March 19, 1987. The City and defense 
counsel were present, but the defendant failed to appear. A 
second pretrial conference was held April 2, 1987. No 
resolution was reached and the case was set for trial May 
18, 1987. (Addendum 2). 
R.R. refers to the Revised Record pages submitted pursuant 
to stipulation of the parties attached as Addendum 1. 
4. On May 18, 1987, the day of the trial, the victim, 
Roosevelt Willburn, appeared in the prosecution's office 
pursuant to a subpoena. At that time he also brought Ms. 
Leslie Sorrel in to the office. Upon questioning by the 
prosecutor it was determined that Ms. Sorrels was an 
eyewitness to the offense charged against the defendant. 
(R.R. 2). 
5. Ms. Sorrels further testified that she came into 
trial that morning because she had been asked by the victim 
Willburn to come and tell what she saw. (R. 45). However, 
she first notified the victim that she had witnessed the 
incident approximately one week before May 5, 1987, when she 
testified in small claims court. (R. 45). 
/ 6. Immediately following discovery of the witness by | 
the prosecution and pursuant to the continuing duty to I 
disclose, Prosecutor Cecelia M. Espenoza, telephoned the [ 
defendant-Mitchell's counsel and indicated that Ms. Sorrels) 
had appeared and would be called as a witness for the 
prosecution. (R.R. 2). 
7. During the trial, two witnesses were called by the 
City. The victim,Mr. Roosevelt Willburn and Ms. Sorrels. 
Mr. Willburn identified the defendant as an individual he 
had known as Mark Miller. (R. 22). Mr. Willburn saw the 
defendant with a tire iron in his hand immediately after he 
heard a knock on the door and looked out the window. (R. 
25). Mr. Willburn testified that he left his room, saw the 
defendant break his windshield and that he was then 
threatened by defendant with a knife, which caused him to 
return to his room. (R. 24; 26). 
8. Ms. Sorrels testified to essentially the same 
/ facts. She was also at the Aquarius Motel on the date of 
I the incident. (R. 37). That she knew both parties, Mr. 
I Mitchell and Mr. Willburn; she heard a crash, looked out the 
I window and saw both men. (R. 38, 40, 41). She also 
observed the victim being chased back into his room by 
defendant, Mark Miller (Mitchell). (R. 41). She believed 
i she saw a knife in the defendant's hand (R. 43). 
9. Appellant-Mitchell testified in his own defense. 
He asserted that he was not present on the date of the 
occurrence. He presented no alibi witness or evidence. (R. 
54). 
10. At trial May 18, 1987, defendant-Mitchell moved to 
/ have Ms. Sorrels testimony excluded based upon State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). (R. 1). The Court denied 
I 
I that motion and defendant's motion to continue or dismiss 
Vjthe case (R.R. 2). 
11. The case was then presented to a jury and 
defendant-Mitchell was found guilty of Vehicle Molestation 
and not guilty of Disturbing the Peace. (R. 98). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE. 
Trial judges are granted broad discretion in managing 
cases and granting continuances. It will be overturned only 
if there is a clear abuse. The applicable statutory law 
provides in pertinent part: 
(b) When an act is required or allowed to be 
done at or within a specified time, the court 
for cause shown may, at any time in its 
discretion: 
(1) With or without motion or notice, order 
the period enlarged if request therefore is 
made before the expiration of the period 
originally prescribed or as extended by a 
previous order; . . . 77-35-2 Utah Code 
Ann., 1953 (emphasis added). 
In interpreting this standard, the Utah Supreme Court 
said: 
It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, 
that the granting of a continuance is at the 
discretion of the trial judge, whose decision 
will not be reversed by this Court absent a 
clear abuse of that discretion. State v. 
Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982) 
citing State v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093 (Utah 
1975). 
Thus, it is clear Utah law that an appellate court will not 
substitute its decision for that of the trial judge in the 
absence of a demonstration of manifest abuse of discretion. 
State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974). 
In the present case, appellant-Mitchell's motion for 
continuance was based, at trial upon State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), which appellant has now abandoned in 
his brief. The reasons for Knight's inapplicability to this 
case are addressed in Point II, infra. However, as 
demonstrated below, it is clear that appellant has failed to 
establish any law or evidence to support a claim of an abuse 
of judicial discretion warranting remand or reversal. 
A. APPELLANT WAS NOT SURPRISED BY WITNESS 
LESLIE SORRELS 
Appellant-Mitchell alleges that the Court abused its 
discretion, in denying his Motion for Continuance, because a 
surprise witness was called to his substantial prejudice. 
However, the record does not support appellant's claims of 
surprise or prejudice. 
For example, appellant-Mitchell's own counsel stated: 
"we were familiar with her name" and ". . . I did try to 
contact Mrs. Sorrels over the weekend [before trial]. I 
just had a real vague address . . ." (R. 1, 2) (Emphasis 
added). From these admissions it is clear that defense 
counsel knew of the witness and cannot now claim surprise. 
The facts in this case closely resemble State v. 
Moraine, 475 P.2d 831 (Utah 1970). In Moraine, no error was 
found in the trial court allowing the state to introduce 
inculpatory statements of the defendants. Similar to the 
case at bar, the defendant knew of the statements before 
trial; however, the Prosecutor did not know of the testimony 
until the "morning of trial," Thus, the lower court 
admitted the newly discovered witnessf s testimony even 
though not disclosed in the Bill of Particulars. Ld. at 
833. 
The case now relied upon by appellant-Mitchell,State v. 
Gaines, 435 P.2d 68 (Ariz App. 1967), cited in appellant's 
Brief, p. 7 is factually distinguishable. There, the 
prosecution dismissed charges against the codefendant and 
called him to the stand on the morning of trial. Thus, the 
witness was known to the prosecution, but not the defense. 
However, in the case at bar, the witness was known to the 
defense but not the prosecution. The surprise was on the 
prosecution who discovered the witness only on the morning 
of trial and promptly notified the defense._. XR^?^ 45). In 
fact, appellant-Mitchell's knowledge of the witness came 
from her testimony at a small claims hearing held 
approximately two weeks before trial (R. 45). The Gaines 
case is totally in apposite to the case here at issue. 
In order for the appellant to prevail, he must show 
that the basis of the continuance is to produce "material 
and admissible testimony" subsequent to exercising "due 
diligence." State v. Creviston, supra, at 752, Accord: 
State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 P. 447 (1906). 
However, since appellant-Mitchell knew of the witness, his 
pretrial remedy and responsibility was to bring a motion to 
continue pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-35-
16(g), which provides: 
(g) If at any time during the course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the attention of 
the court that a party has failed to comply 
with this rule, the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, 
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems 
just under the circumstances. (Emphasis 
added). 
In this case, appellant-Mitchell made a choice not to 
request an order from the court in advance of trial because 
he knew Ms. Sorrels testimony was inculpatory; further, 
2 
appellant knew via the police report that the City was 
unaware of Ms. Sorrels. When the prosecution did become 
knowledgeable and informed appellant's counsel, he was not 
surprised by the testimony or prejudiced in his defense; in 
point-of-fact, appellant-Mitchell only objects to truthful 
testimony he hoped would not come forward. (Respondent's 
Statement of Facts Nos. 4-8). 
There is no abuse of discretion when a Court denies a 
motion to suppress made by a party who "knew or could have 
discovered the evidence prior to trial"; also, there is no 
error to admit "newly discovered evidence" which was 
actually within the defendant's knowledge. State v. Sparks, 
672 P.2d 92 (Utah, 1983); State v. Moraine, supra at 833. 
See, appellant-Mitchell's Addendum "B" to his Brief. 
B. APPELLANT'S ALLEGED IMPEACHMENT OF MS. 
SORRELS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED; THUS, 
APPELLANT-MITCHELL HAS FAILED TO SHOW AN 
ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION OR 
PREJUDICE. 
Appellant claims prejudice because the testimony given 
by Ms. Sorrels corroborated the testimony of the victim and 
3 
contradicted appellant's defense, which was that he as not 
even present at the crime scene. The long established rule 
is that "all persons other than those excepted by statute 
may be witnesses." State v. Greene, 38 Utah 389, 115 P. 181 
(1910). Further, impeachment on the basis of past crimes 
is seriously limited to avoid unfair harassment of witnesses 
and wrongly prejudice truthful and relevant evidence by an 
appeal to bias and prejudice. Utah law would have precluded 
appellant-Mitchell's naked attempt to impeach Ms. Sorrels on 
such grounds. Utah law provides: 
It is the right of a witness to be protected 
from irrelevant, improper or insulting 
questions, and from harsh or insulting 
demeanor, to be detained only so long as the 
interests of justice require it, and to be 
examined only as to matters legal and 
pertinent to the issue. 78-24-11 Utah Code 
Ann., 1953. (Emphasis added). 
A prior version of this statute interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court as early as 1898: 
[W]as intended to allow impeachment of a 
witness by introduction of character evidence 
only so far as the witnessf general character 
is in issue in the case. State v. Marks, 16 
Utah 204, 51 P. 1089 (Utah 1898). 
Appellant-Mitchell's Brief, p. 8. 
Ms. Sorrels' character was not an issue in this case. 
In the present case appellant's allegation of error 
centers on the FBI rap sheet which was obtained subsequent 
to trial. Appellant claims that the rap sheet shows areas 
where Ms. Sorrels credibility could be impeached. 
Respondent submits that had Ms. Sorrels been known to 
appellant as a witness counsel would request a state rap 
sheet from respondent. That rap sheet (Respondent's 
Addendum 3) would not show any convictions which could be 
used against the witness. 
Even taking the FBI rap sheet, it the light most 
favorable to appellant's claims, it fails to reveal 
convictions which could be used to impeach the witness. 
The charges noted in the FBI rap sheet must meet the 
standards of Utah Rules of Evidence Section 609 to have been 
used against Ms. Sorrels. Here convictions, occurring "more 
than 10 years prior" are statutorily barred 609(b) Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
Appellant-Mitchell argues that Ms. Sorrels has 
"arrests" for crimes which fall within the 609(a)(2) 
impeachment standards. However, Section 609 requires a 
conviction. 
Further, there must be a finding by the Court that the 
probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. Regarding this point our Supreme Court 
recently excluded felony convictions and reversed a lower 
court admission of prior felony conviction for impeachment. 
It noted that Rule 609(a) permits "convictions" not 
involving honesty or false statements to be used for 
impeachment, but: 
. . • only if the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting the 
evidence out weighs its prejudicial 
effect. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 
1334 (Utah 1986) (Emphasis in original 
and citations omitted). 
The case of State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah 
1977), cited at appellant-Mitchell's Brief at p. 9, is not 
to the contrary. Rather, the case stands for the position 
that appellant must demonstrate a "reasonable probability" 
that the defendant would have not been convicted. Having 
failed to demonstrate clear abuse, appellant has failed to 
meet that test. As with Banner the information is 
excludable and prejudicial, as a matter of law. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that since she 
could not have been impeached based upon the "rap" sheet, 
appellant-Mitchell was not prejudiced by the Court's denial 
of his Motion to Continue, and there was no abuse of 
discretion. The conviction should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT-MITCHELL WAS NOT DENIED DUE 
PROCESS BY THE PROSECUTION'S VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE OF AN INCULPATORY WITNESS, AT 
THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY. 
Appellant-Mitchell's motions at trial were 
alternatively, a Motion to Exclude Ms. Sorrel's testimony or 
a Motion to Continue (R. 1, 2). Although both motions were 
properly denied by the City admits as general principle of 
law that error may attach if the prosecution willfully 
withholds information. 
The law on the subject of when the withholding of 
evidence by the prosecution denies a defendant due process 
of law has been set down by the United States Supreme Court 
in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
In Brady the U.S. Supreme Court established the basic 
principle that suppression of requested and favorable 
material evidence by the prosecution, violates due process. 
However, it is clear that the information must be 
within the knowledge of the prosecution and must be 
requested; voluntary disclosure of inculpatory evidence 
the prosecution is not required. State v. Workman,(635 P.2d 
[9 (Utah 1981).) In Workman, the Utah Supreme Court rejected 
the defendant which would have required the 
prosecution to voluntarily disclose inculpatory evidence. 
The Court cited Moore v. Illinois, to establish when due 
process requires suppression: 
The heart of the holding in Brady is the 
prosecution1s suppression of evidence, in the 
face of a defense production request, where 
the evidence is favorable to the accused and 
is material either to guilty or to 
punishment. Important then, are (a) 
suppression by the prosecution after a 
request by the defense, (b) the evidence's 
favorable character for the defense, and (c) 
the materiality of the evidence. These are 
the standards by which the prosecutions? 
conduct in Moore's case is to be measured. 
State v. Workman, Id. at p. 52 citing Moore 
v. 111., 408 U.S. 786 (1972) reh. den. 409 
U.S. 897 (1972) (Emphasis added). 
Appellant-Mitchell has failed to establish any of these 
elements. Appellant^made no request for the information. <y 
He knew of the witness existence and had received the police 
report; thus, he knew that the witness was not listed. He 
did not request information about her whereabouts for 
reasons discussed in Point I A supra. There was no 
surprise, except the late discovery by the prosecution of 
what appellant-Mitchell already knew. 
Further, the evidence^in question was inculpatory 
testimony of a collateral witness; thus, it was not 
favorable to the defense. 
Lastly, the third prong of the test "materiality" is 
defined in State v. Shaffer; here, our Court observed: 
[C]onstitutional materiality requires that 
there be a showing that the suppressed or 
destroyed evidence is vital to the issues of 
whether defendant is guilty of the charge and 
whether there is a fundamental unfairness 
that requires the Court to set aside the 
defendant' s conviction." State v. Shaffer, 
725 P.2d 1301, 1305 (Utah 1986). 
Inculpatory information, such as an additional witness, will 
not meet this standard of "materiality." 
In the present case, the prosecution provided all it 
knew and more information than was statutorily required. 
Therefore, even if defense counsel had not received a 
telephone call from the prosecution on the morning of trial, 
the Court could have allowed Ms. Sorrels to testify. 
For a case closely in point see State v. Adams, 583 
P.2d 89 (Utah 1978). Here the defendant was not informed of 
an admission made to a police officer, but on appeal the 
Court found no reversible error and correctly observed: 
In regard to defendant's final point: That 
prejudicial error was committed because the 
prosecution did not disclose to him that it 
intended to use the testimony of Officer Reit 
concerning defendant's admission, this is to 
be said: We are in agreement with the 
proposition that the prosecution is under an 
obligation to treat the defendant fairly; and 
that it cannot willfully suppress evidence 
favorable to him for the purpose of obtaining 
a conviction. However, as will be seen from 
what has been said above, there was no abuse 
of that principle. The defendant and his 
counsel were aware of what had happened; and 
there was no suppression of evidence 
involved. State v. Adams, Id. at 91; accord: 
State v. Jarrell, Utah 608 P.2d 218 (1980); 
see also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 
1985), where the evidence challenged by the 
defendant was corroborative of the State's 
case. 
As in the Carter case, Ms. Sorrels was not the only 
witness to appellant-Mitchell's conduct. Victim-Willburn, 
also, identified the appellant as the person he saw 
4 
threatening him with a knife. The case law is clear that 
the prosecution has been relieved of the obligation to 
provide even exculpatory information, if the record does not 
show that "thef prosecution knew or should have known" about 
the information. See also, State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751 
(Utah 1981). 
See respondent's Statement of Fact 7. 
Unlike State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) cited 
by appellant-Mitchell, this is not a case where defendant 
made a motion to compel. However, even if a motion had been 
made, the prosecution did not know of the witness until just 
before trial. (See Statement of Fact Nos. 4, 5). Even if 
the appellant requested and received an order from the Court 
to disclose inculpatory information, if it is contrary to 
the prosecution's rights, the prosecution could have refused 
to honor the order and still submitted the evidence. 
Where the court orders the prosecuting 
attorney in a bill of particulars to give 
matters not required by the statute, the 
court may excuse the failure to furnish such 
material by permitting the evidence to be 
introduced, as was done in this case. 
Besides, if anyone knew about the statement, 
it surely was the defendant himself. State 
v. Moraine, infra at 833. (Emphasis added). 
Here, the prosecution did not know of the witness until 
the morning of trial, the witness was inculpatory and 
* • — — " " " ~ j ^ ~ 
appellant knew about her prior to the time of trial. 
Therefore, the Court properly denied appellant-Mitchell's 
motions. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision to grant or deny a request for a 
continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Where the appellant knows of a witness, he cannot 
claim prejudice based upon surprise. 
5 
See respondent's Statement of Fact, Nos. 4-6. 
The testimony of witness Sorrels was admissible and not 
subject to impeachment, based on the evidence presented 
after the trial. 
Finally, the prosecution was not required to provide 
inculpatory evidence to the appellant. The prosecution's 
voluntary disclosure, as soon as practical, was evidence of 
the good faith of the prosecution. Appellant suffered no 
denial of due process and therefore, the conviction should 
stand. 
Respectfully submitted this ,9 day of 
<£LcLL , 1988 . 
?
^u^u^ 
CECELIA M. ESPENQ2A 
ADDENDUM 1 
AUUJLNUUM 1 
SALT LAKE CITY VS. MARK MILLER 
The Court is in session: 
Judge: Salt Lake City vs. Michael Cook. 
Salt Lake City v. Mark Miller. 
Ms.E: Cecelia Espenoza on behalf of the City, Your Honor. 
Mr.D: Lynn Donaldson on behalf of Mark Miller. Mark is here. 
Judge: You ready to proceed? 
Ms.E: I believe so Your Honor. 
Judge: You ready to proceed, Mr. Donaldson? 
Mr.D: Yes, Your Honor 
Judge: Have the jury, we'll have the jury brought in. 
(Inaudible comments of Mr. Donaldson and Ms. Expenoza). Have you 
heard from Mr* Stevens on this other case? 
Ms.E: No, your honor I haven't. 
Mr.D: There is one issue maybe we should deal with before the 
jury come, your Honor. Apparently, the prosecution just had a 
witness come in this morning that we were familiar with her name, 
we had never known they were going to call her as a witness. And 
we didn't have her address or weren't able to run a rap sheet on 
her. Her name is Leslie Sorrell, we ask that she be excluded 
based on State vs. Knight. 
Ms.E: Your Honor, the City would submit pursuant to State vs. 
Knight, that our obligation is simply to inform the Defense as 
soon as we know of any witnesses, of their presence and of the 
fact that we would be intending to call them. As soon as I found 
out she came in this morning, and may have positive testimony as 
to this case, I did call Mr. Donaldson at his office this morning 
and informed him of that. He said he did not have any prior 
knowledge of this witness, we did not have her name listed on the 
police report nor did we have an address or phone for her prior 
to this time. I believe the City had met our burden under State 
vs. Knight by contacting the defense counsel as soon as we knew 
of that information. We do believe the testimony she would give 
on this case would be relevant and we do request that she be 
allowed to testify. 
Judge: Do you have any belief or reason to believe that the 
City has intentionally or negligently failed to advise you of 
this witness? 
Mr.D: No, Your Honor. I guess the only thing that we could 
do then would be to ask for a continuance. I know this case has 
sort of drug out but, I did try to contact Mrs. Sorrels over the 
weekend. I just had a real vague address - State Street, 48th 
South, I went knocking on houses and the whole bit. Wasn't able 
to fine her. 
Judge: Motion to dismiss or motion to exclude the witness from 
testifying in the case or a motion to continue, all of those 
motions are denied under the circumstances, we will proceed. 
Clerk: What was the witness's first name? 
Ms.E: Leslie. 
Clerk: Inaudible 
Judge: It doesn't appear we have the necessary number of 
jurors. Some of them have been straggling in. I'm probably 
going to have to set my jury calls for a little bit earlier to 
make sure they get here. I hate to inconvenience the jurors that 
way but if they're not going to get here, I'm going to have to do 
it. The Court will recess now. 
ADDENDUM 2 
ADDENDUM 2 
T^H CIRCUIT COURT 
"endant 
SLC 
D O C K E T 
CITATION: 
MILLER, MARK AKA MITCHELL 
352 WESTMINSTER 
SLC UT 
Page 1 
WEDNESDAY AUGUST 5, 1987 
3:46 PM 
CPR Case: 860091082 MC 
City Misdemeanor 
NO CDR # FOR THIS CASE 
rges 
iolation Date: 12/20/86 
1. MOLEST VEHICLE 
Plea: Not Guilty 
2. DISTURBING THE PEACE 
Plea: Not Guilty 
32-3-8 
Finding/Judgment: Guilty - Jury 
32-1-11 
Finding/Judgment: Not Guilty - Jury 
Bail 
100.00 
62.50 
:eedings 
!3/86 Case filed on 12/23/86. LKC 
Began tracking Review on 03/23/87 LKC 
•2/87 GIBSON/CKO T209 DPWOC DPNG TRIAL 2-9-87 9:30 A.M. CKO 
TRL scheduled for 2/ 9/87 at 9:30 A in room ? with RCG JJW 
Ended tracking of Prosecutor's Stay JJW 
3/87 GIBSON/CKO T210 DPWOC C/O REFER TO LDA (ATTY FEES) CKO 
4/87 FILED APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL LDA L DONALDSON JLC 
FILED REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY JLC 
9/87 GIBSON/CKO/KEESLER T283 C223 DPW LYNN DONALDSON LDA TO FTLE CKO 
JURY DEMAND C/O PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE TO BE SET CKO 
3/87 JURY DEMAND FILED ON 2-10-87 - LDA. EEM 
3/87 FILED SUBPOENA AOK 
D/87 GIBSON/CKO C/O PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE 3-19-87 9:30 A.M. (LYNN CKO 
DONALDSON & CITY NOTIFIED) CKO 
PTC scheduled for 3/19/87 at 9:30 A in room ? with RCG CKO 
)/87 GIBSON/CKO/GEORGE T588 C1580 DNP CHERYL JOLLEY FOR LYNN CKO 
DONALDSON. C/O BW BAIL $505 CKO 
•/87 Warrant ordered AOK 
Bench Warrant printed AOK 
/87 Warrant order updated AOK 
BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE RCG AOK 
Failure to comply with court order AOK 
Bail amount ordered: 505.00 AOK 
/87 GBISON/CKO T631 C2728 DPW LYNN DONALDSON C/O RECALL BW CKO 
C/O PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE RESET FOR 4-2-87 9:00 A.M. CKO 
CITY NOTIFIED CKO 
PTC scheduled for 4/ 2/87 at 9:00 A in room ? with RCG CKO 
Warrant recalled on 03/27/87 because of Court Order CKO 
'87 GIBSON/CKO/ESPENOZA T695 C13 07 DPW LYNN DONALDSON. DEFT ADVISED. CKO 
C/O JURY TRIAL 5-18-87 9:00 A.M. CKO 
TRJ scheduled for 5/18/87 at 9:00 A in room ? with RCG CKO 
'87 FILED SUBPOENA ON RETURN JJW 
'87 GIBSON/CKO/ESPENOZA T1044 C545 T1061 C0001 T1062 C0001 DPW CKO 
LYNN DONALDSON. A JURY OF 4 PERSONS, NAMELY 1-RUTH ANN PUTNAM, CKO 
2-J HAROLD JONES 3-MAE JEANNINE OHRN AND 4-HEIDI RIGBY BECK CKO 
WERE SWORN AND IMPANELED. DEFTS MOTION C/O WITNESSES EXCLUDED. CKO 
CITY WITNESSES LESLIE SORRELS AND ROOSEVELT WILBURN WERE SWORN CKO 
AND TESTIFIED. DEFTS TRUE NAME MARK ANTHONY MITCHELL. CITY RESTS CKO 
DEFT AND ROZALIND DIANE SMITH WERE SWORN AND TESTIFIED ON CKO 
DEFTS BEHALF. D-l-LIST OF MOTEL RESIDENTS MARKED BUT NOT CKO 
D O C K E T Page 2 
CIRCUIT COURT - SLC WEDNESDAY AUGUST 5, 1987 
3:46 PM 
idant CITATION: CPR Case: 860091082 MC 
CILLER, MARK AKA MITCHELL City Misdemeanor 
>/87 RECEIVED. DEFT RESTS. JURY FINDS DEFT NOT GUILTY OF 32-1-11 CKO 
AND GUILTY OF 32-3-8 C/O REFERRRED TO AP&P SENTENCING 6-22-87 CKO 
9:00 A.M. CKO 
:/87 SNT scheduled for 6/22/87 at 9:00 A in room ? with RCG CKO 
!/87 GIBSON/CKO T1314 C432 DPW LYNN DONALDSON. SENTENCE 6 MONTHS CKO 
JAIL $500 ATTY FEES $549.23 RESTITUTION TO BE PAID TO THE CKO 
COURT. ALL BUT 30 DAYS JAIL SUSPENDED ON 1 YEAR AP&P PROBATION CKO 
AFTER SERVING 3 0 DAYS JAIL CONDITIONS 1-40 HOURS COMMUNITY CKO 
SERVICE THRU JAIL ALTERNATIVE 2-RULES OF AP&P CKO 
3-VOCATIONAL & SUBSTANCE COUNSELING 4-7ULLTIME EMPLOYMENT CKO 
5-DO NOT ASSOCIATE WITH PERSON USING NON PRESCRIBED DRUGS CKO 
ATTY FEES & RESTITUTION STAY 12-22-87 PROBATION 7-22-88 CKO 
./87 CREATE Trust A/R # 01 Restitution 549.23 CKO 
CREATE Trust A/R # 02 Attorney Fee - City 500.00 CKO 
Began tracking Fine Stay Review on 12/22/87 CKO 
Began tracking Probation Review on 07/22/88 CKO 
)/J}7 FILED NOTICE OF APPEAL BVO 
FILED DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL BVO 
FILED NOTICE REGARDING TRANSCRIPT BVO 
1/87 TRANSFERRED CERTIFIED COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL, NOTICE REGARDING BVO 
TRANSCRIPT, .AND DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL TO COURT OF BVO 
APPEALS. BVO 
anting Summary 
citation Amount: 162.50 
\/R Type: Total Due Received Paid 
Restitution # 01 549.23 
attorney Fee # 02 500.00 
bional Case Data 
Fine Summary 
Fine: $1049.23 Suspended: 
Jail: 180 Suspended: 150 
Parties 
Payee #01 
CARTOW 
27 WALKER PL 
SLC UT Work Phone: ( ) 
Payee #02 
SALT LAKE CITY TREASURER 
Personal Description 
Sex: M DOB: 
Dr. Lie. No.: State: UT Expires: 
'TH CIRCUIT COURT - SLC 
'endant 
MILLER, MARK AKA MITCHELL 
D O C K E T 
CITATION: 
WEDNESDAY 
CPR 
City 
Page 3 
AUGUST 5, 1987 
3:46 PM 
Case: 860091082 MC 
Misdemeanor 
SCHEDULED HEARING SUMMARY 
TRIAL 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
JURY TRIAL 
SENTENCING 
on 02/09/87 0930 A in room 
on 03/19/87 0930 A in room 
on 04/02/87 0900 A in room 
on 05/18/87 0900 A in room 
on 06/22/87 0900 A in room 
with RCG 
with RCG 
with RCG 
with RCG 
with RCG 
TRACKING STATUS 
Fine Stay 
Probation 
End of the docket report for this case. 
Review Date 
12/22/87 
07/22/88 
day o* ' — _ P * u U 
Gerti 
Deputy 
By 
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(FINAL DISPOSITION) 
032405 0-FOROERY 
032405 D-GHARGE DISMISSED. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to Lynn C. Donaldson, Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association, Attorney for Appellant, 333 
South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by depositing 
the same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this day 
of January, 1988. 
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